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a b s t r a c t
In this article, we discuss how to deal with black swans in a risk context. A black swan is here understood as
a surprising extreme event relative to one's knowledge/beliefs, and can be of different types: a) unknown
unknowns, b) unknown knowns (we do not have the knowledge but others do) and c) events that are
judged to have a negligible probability of occurrence and thus are not believed to occur. In the article, we
review the current approaches for confronting black swans, the aim being to gain new insights by addressing
the three types of black swans separately, motivated by the fact that they require different types of measures.
The main conclusions of the article are that there is a need to i) extend the current risk conceptualisation and
treatment frameworks to include the black swan risk, ii) develop a new generation of risk assessment and
decision support methods that place more emphasis on the black swan risk and iii) better understand what
analysis captures and what lies within the management domain.
& 2014 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
1. Introduction
Three major strategies are commonly used to manage risk: risk-
informed, cautionary/precautionary, and discursive [33]. In most
cases the appropriate strategy would be a mixture of these three.
The risk-informed strategy involves the treatment of risk – avoid-
ance, reduction, transfer and retention – by the use of risk assess-
ments. The cautionary/precautionary strategy is also referred to as a
strategy of robustness and resilience, and highlights features such as
containment, constant monitoring, research to increase knowledge
and development of substitutes. In the discursive strategy, measures
are employed to build conﬁdence and trustworthiness, through the
reduction of uncertainties, clariﬁcation of facts, involvement of
affected people, deliberation and accountability.
In this article, we focus on risk related to black swan type of
events, here understood as surprising extreme events relative to
one's knowledge/beliefs [5]. How should we confront this risk?
Taleb proposes “to stand our current approaches to prediction,
prognostication, and risk management on their heads” ([41], p. 4, 5).
When looking at much of the current thinking about risk assessment
and management, with its focus on probability modelling and
estimations, Taleb's view is understandable. However, risk manage-
ment is required in order to ﬁnd the proper measures to confront the
occurrence of potential events. There are always limited resources
available for this purpose, and the risk assessment provides decision
support. The decision makers need to be informed about issues
related to important precursors, the uncertainties, the knowledge
available and so on. In a particular case, a decision maker may need
to choose between investments in some measures that are effective
in the case of some events but not in others, and investments in
other measures with the reverse effect. Accurate predictions and
estimates cannot be provided but, in most cases, informative risk
descriptions can. This perspective seems to be the one adopted by
Paté-Cornell [31] in her thought provoking analysis of how to
confront the black swan risks. She takes an engineering risk analysis
perspective, which highlights information gathering and analysis in
support of proactive risk management decisions; due weight is given
to the reinforcement of relevant systems, and thoughtful response
strategies are developed.
In this article, we review current approaches to confronting
black swans, having a special focus on the risk analysis approach
and robust/resilient thinking. By distinguishing between different
types of black swans, the article seeks to gain new insights on how
to best deal with black swans. A speciﬁc issue raised is the use of
risk assessments in such settings. What form and role can and
should they take to provide useful decision support?
The article is organised as follows: First, in Section 2, we provide a
detailed analysis of the concept of black swans. To provide a mean-
ingful study on how to confront black swans, it is essential to have a
clear understanding of this concept and the different types of black
swans. Then, in Section 3, we perform the aforementioned review
and discussion of some current approaches to confronting these
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events. This review is followed up in Section 4 with a discussion of
how to meet the different types of black swans. Finally, Section 5
provides some conclusions.
The most novel part of the article is Section 4, where the
analysis relates to a recent categorisation of black swans. However,
also the other sections present to a large extent new and original
material, by integrating and reﬂecting upon existing work, provid-
ing conceptual clariﬁcations (as in Section 2), as well as providing
guidance on how to best confront the black swans.
2. What is a black swan?
The metaphor and concept of the black swan has gained a lot of
attention recently and is a hot topic in many forums that discuss
safety and risk. In the scientiﬁc community it has also been a focus
in the aftermath of Nassib Taleb's The Black Swan [40]. Taleb refers
to a black swan as an event with the following three attributes.
Firstly, it is an outlier, as it lies outside the realm of regular
expectations, because nothing in the past can convincingly point
to its possibility. Secondly, it carries an extreme impact. Thirdly,
despite its outlier status, human nature makes us concoct expla-
nations for its occurrence after the fact, making it explainable and
predictable. Other deﬁnitions of black swans have also been
suggested. Aven [5] refers to a black swan as a surprisingly
extreme event relative to one's belief/knowledge, and in Aven
and Krohn [8] three main types of black swan events have been
identiﬁed based on this deﬁnition:
a) Events that were completely unknown to the scientiﬁc envir-
onment (unknown unknowns)
b) Events not on the list of known events from the perspective of
those who carried out a risk analysis (or another stakeholder),
but known to others (unknown knowns – unknown events to
some, known to others)
c) Events on the list of known events in the risk analysis but
judged to have negligible probability of occurrence, and thus
not believed to occur.
The term “black swan” is used to express any of these types of
events, tacitly assuming that it carries an extreme impact.
The ﬁrst category of black swan type of events (a) is the
extreme – the type of event is unknown to the scientiﬁc commu-
nity. A good example is the effects of the thalidomide drug [38].
The drug was introduced in 1957 and not long after children were
observed with gross limb malformations of an unusual form. In
activities about which there is considerable knowledge, such
unknown unknowns are likely to be rarer than in cases of severe
or deep uncertainties.
The second type of black swans (b) is events that are not
captured by the relevant risk assessments, either because we do
not know them or we have not made a sufﬁciently thorough
consideration. If the event then occurs, it was not foreseen. If a
more thorough risk analysis had been conducted, the event could
have been identiﬁed. The September 11 attack is a good example
of this type of black swans.
The third category of black swans comprises events that occur
despite the fact that the probability of occurrence is judged to be
negligible. The events are known, but considered so unlikely that
they are ignored – they are not believed to occur and cautionary
measures are not implemented. An example is the event that an
underwater volcano eruption occurs in the Atlantic Sea leading to
a tsunami affecting, for example, Norway. The events are on the
list of hazards and risk sources but then removed as their
probability is judged as negligible. Their occurrence will come as
a surprise. The tsunami that destroyed the Fukushima Daiichi
nuclear plant was similarly removed from the lists due to the
judgement of negligible probability.
The black swans’ “surprising” aspect must always be under-
stood in relation to by whom and when. Figs. 1–4 illustrate this.
We consider an activity, for instance, the operation of an offshore
installation, at a given future time period, for example, next year.
We let C denote the consequences of the activity in relation to the
values we are concerned about (life, health, environmental,
assets). What C will be is unknown to us at time s; there are risks
Fig. 1. Illustration of risk in relation to the time dimension. C: consequence
of activity.
Fig. 2. Illustration of relationship between risk, black swan and the time
dimension.
C4
Fig. 3. Illustration of risk in relation to the time dimension when the perspective is
macro, for example the whole oil and gas industry.
Fig. 4. Illustration of relationship between risk, black swan and the time dimension
when the perspective is macro, for example the whole oil and gas industry.
T. Aven / Reliability Engineering and System Safety 134 (2015) 83–9184
present. We assume now that a risk assessment of the activity has
been conducted at the time s. Time goes by, and C is realised,
usually without a major accident occurring. But let us imagine that
such an accident actually occurs, as shown in Fig. 2. Think about
the Macondo accident as an example. The accident is a result of a
combination of events and conditions occurring and comes as a
surprise to those involved in the management of the activity. In
the Macondo case, this combination includes [30]
 erroneous assessments of the results of pressure tests
 failure to identify that the formation ﬂuid penetrated the well,
despite the fact that log data showed that this was the case
 the diverter system was unable to divert gas
 the cutting valve (Blind Shear Ram) in the Blow Out Preventer
did not seal the well
The accident is a black swan for them. It came as a surprise that
such a sequence of events could occur; they had not thought of
such a scenario. It is a black swan of type b). If they had thought of
it, they would have concluded that it was so unlikely that one
could ignore the possibility of the scenario occurring. It would
have been a black swan of type c).
Now let us take a macro perspective – looking at a large
number of such activities, for example, the whole oil industry.
Risk is now linked to the occurrence of any major accident in the
industry; where and how the event occurs is not the issue. Again, a
risk assessment is conducted. It is concluded that there is a
relatively high probability that such an accident could occur.
Consequently, one cannot say that it is a black swan if such an
event actually occurs (see Figs. 3 and 4). From a macro perspective,
a realistic analysis would state that we must expect that a major
accident will occur somewhere in the next ten years. However,
there is no law that says that it will actually happen. We are not
subject to fate or destiny. Each unit (organisation, company,
installation) works hard to prevent such an accident from actually
occurring. It is believed that with systematic safety work this goal
can be achieved. Accordingly, any such serious accident normally
comes as a surprise (as discussed by, e.g. [42]); it is a black swan
for those involved in the operation and management of the
activity. Hence, one must be careful in describing the perspective
when discussing whether an event is a black swan.
Paté-Cornell [31] discusses the concept of black swans and
relates it to the “perfect storm” metaphor. This storm resulted
from the combination of a storm that started over the United
States, a cold front coming from the north, and the tail of a tropical
storm originating in the south. All three meteorological features
were known before and occur regularly, but the combination is
very rare. The crew of a ﬁshing boat decided to take the risk and
face the storm, but they had not foreseen its strength. The storm
strikes the boat, it capsizes and sinks; nobody survives [31].
This extreme storm is now used as a metaphor for a rare event
that may occur, where we understand the relevant phenomena.
The experts can calculate the probabilities of such events and the
associated risks with a high degree of precision. They can make
accurate predictions of what will happen, stating that in one in ten
such situations the waves will be like this, and in one in 100 such
cases the waves will become so big and so on. When we build oil
and gas installations offshore we take into account such events.
We set requirements for the installation's strength to enable it to
withstand extreme waves, but there is always a limit. We must
accept that there may be a wave that is so large that the
installation will not tolerate it, but such an event should have a
very small probability.
The situation has similarities to that found in other areas such
as health and trafﬁc. We know quite precisely in many cases what
proportion of the population will contract certain diseases next
year and how many people will die in trafﬁc. Actions can be taken
to reduce risks, and we can measure changes over time. When one
looks at the number of fatalities from the 1970 s to the present
day, the ﬁgures show a steady decrease, despite the fact that trafﬁc
has increased. The risk management works.
The metaphor of the “perfect storm” is thus about events
where science in traditional form prevails, where we have precise
probabilities and relevant statistics, and where we can make
accurate predictions about the future. The black swan type of
event c) seems to be covered by the rare event of the perfect storm
form. There is, however, an important difference. In relation to
perfect storms, the variation in the phenomena is known; we face
risk problems where the uncertainties are small; the knowledge
base is strong and accurate predictions can be made. As the
knowledge base is so strong, black swans can for all practical
reasons be ignored. The probabilities are frequentist probabilities,
characterising the variation in the phenomena, and they are
known to a degree that is viewed as certainty.
For the black swans of type c), we are in a situation where we
cannot make this type of accurate prediction. The variation in the
phenomena cannot be described with this type of precision. We
need to rely on judgements (subjective judgements), where
probability refers to the knowledge-based (judgemental, subjec-
tive) assignment of uncertainties and degrees of belief. When
stating that an event is judged to have negligible probability and
not believed to occur, it is with reference to such a perspective.
Clearly, in such cases we may experience surprises compared to
the judgements made.
Think again about the oil and gas installation. The management
of the installation may ignore the possibility of a speciﬁc event
occurring, arguing in this way. It is not a perfect storm type of
event as it cannot be predicted with accuracy. Taking the macro
perspective for the industry as discussed above, we are closer to
the perfect storm situation. If we consider the industry as a whole,
it does not make sense to talk about black swans as the probability
of occurrence is rather high. But let us make a thought-construc-
tion; we assume that the frequentist probability of the occurrence
of such an event is rather low. It is a rare event. Would it then be a
black swan? No, is the answer, as the variation is still known, the
phenomena studied are well understood. Further reﬂections may
however challenge this view.
If we have a situation with perfect information about the
variation of the phenomena – we know the frequentist probability
distribution (we are in the perfect storm situation); one can argue
that the occurrence of a low frequentist probability event should
not come as a surprise. It is rare, but it is knownwith certainty that
the event will occur sooner or later. Hence, it is not a black swan
(type c). However, one can also argue differently. Given the
knowledge about the variation in the phenomena, it is considered
so unlikely that the event will occur the next year, say, that it is not
believed to occur. Hence, it can be viewed as a black swan of type
(c) if it in fact does occur. Again we see that whether the event is a
black swan or not is in the eyes of the beholder.
In practice, we cannot fully understand the variation. If we go
back some years, we would not think about terrorism events as a
contributing factor to the variation, and hence a black swan may
occur even if the phenomenon is considered well understood. This
type of black swans is, however, not of type c), but of type a) or b).
The discussion here relates to the distinction between common-
cause variation and special-cause variation in the quality discourse
[12,16,36,37]. The common-cause variation captures “normal”
system variation, whereas the special causes are linked to the
unusual variation and the surprises, the black swans [7].
We may also talk about “near-black swans”, meaning surprises
relative to one's knowledge/beliefs, but where the event did not
result in extreme consequences; the barriers worked and avoided
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the extreme outcomes. A black swan can occur as a result of a set
of events and conditions, and a subset of these may generate a
near-black swan.
3. Review and discussion of some basic approaches for
managing risk and black swans
The introductory section pointed to some of the main approaches
to treating risk and surprises. The easiest case to handle is risk
problems where the uncertainties are small – the knowledge base is
strong and accurate predictions can be conducted; that is, the
situation is characterised by perfect storms. For this type of problem,
standard risk analysis using statistical methods, as described for
example by Paté-Cornell [31], can be used to make rational decisions,
as seen for instance in the trafﬁc and health areas. However, few
problems in real life can be classiﬁed as perfect storms; surprises and
black swans may occur, and the issue is how to confront this type
of risk.
It is obviously not straightforward to assess and manage the black
swan type of risks, and different approaches are recommended.
Perhaps the most commonly referred to is the use of precursors of
such events [31,19,43,23]. Through a mix of alertness, quick detec-
tion, and early response, the black swan event can be avoided.
But how can we avoid missing or ignoring early signals and
precursors of serious events, or, on the opposite side, exaggerating
them? It is common practice to refer to false negatives (no
indication of a risk situation when one is actually present) and
false positives (erroneous signals indicating some risk situation is
present when it is not), but how can we make judgements about
these “errors” when we do not know the outcomes of the events
or situations under observation before they occur? It is easy to
identify (and claim) that we missed a risk event or situation with
hindsight a posteriori, when the accident, disaster or crisis has
occurred, but how can we know in advance that we are missing,
ignoring or exaggerating signals or precursors, given that we are
typically exposed to a large number of threats/hazards? The
reference for our evaluation of the signals and precursors cannot
be the unknown consequences or outcomes of events yet to occur.
The only possible way out seems to be to rely on the results of risk
and uncertainty assessments, where the warning system itself can
be viewed as a form of risk assessment. However, risk assessment
has its limitations as a tool for this purpose and, in cases when the
knowledge base is not strong, we need to base the judgements on
hypotheses and assumptions, and we may act too slowly (or too
quickly). An example is the AIDS epidemic, which was detected in
the United States by the Center for Disease Control in 1981, and
given that it had probably been spreading for decades, the
response was rather slow [31].
This leads us to the use of two other approaches for dealing
with black swan type of events: adaptive risk analysis and robust
analysis. Adaptive analysis is based on the acknowledgement that
one best decision cannot be made but rather a set of alternatives
should be dynamically tracked to gain information and knowledge
about the effects of different courses of action. On an overarching
level, the basic process is straightforward: one chooses an action
based on broad considerations of risk and other aspects, monitors
the effect, and adjusts the action based on the monitored results
[26]. A central idea is that because uncertainty is pervasive, one
optimal management choice is not achievable; rather, we have a
range of often competing decision alternatives, which we dyna-
mically track to gain information and knowledge about the system,
and about the effects of different courses of action. In this way we
may also avoid black swan type of events.
In non-trivial systems, surprises will occur and then we need to
be able to absorb and analyse relevant information and take
adequate actions. Adaptive risk analysis can be a useful tool in this
respect. So is abductive thinking:
You observe a fact … In order to explain and understand this,
you cast about in your mind for some glimmering theory,
explanation, ﬂash and so forth. The process of abduction takes
place between the result (observed fact) and the rule (explana-
tion), and concludes with the positioning of a hopefully
satisfactory hypothesis. ([18], p. 183)
As presented by Pettersen [32], abduction can be seen as the
process of noticing an anomaly and getting an explanatory hunch
[14]. By means of abduction, a new idea (or hypothesis) is brought
up from the region where “all things swim”. This process can be
shown as a three-step process:
1. A surprising fact is noticed.
2. An aesthetic (unfettered) exploration of qualities and relation-
ships is made.
3. Abductive reasoning is applied to make a guess that could
explain the surprising fact (Chiasson, 2001) [14].
In a process plant, abduction could mean to notice that the
pressure is increasing, explore why, and provide a hypothesis to
explain it. Testing can then be carried out to prove or disprove the
hypothesis. The approach is in line with fundamental ideas of the
quality discourse, which highlights that knowledge is built on theory
([25]; see also [12]). As formulated by [16], rational prediction and
analysis requires theory and builds knowledge through systematic
revision and extension of theory based on a comparison of prediction
with observation. Without theory, experience has no meaning, and
without theory there is no learning.
Bayesian decision analysis provides a strong theoretical frame-
work for choosing optimal decisions in the case of information in
the form of signals and warning, but, in many cases, it is difﬁcult to
use in practice. Instead, based on a crude assessment of risk and
other relevant concerns, we may search for procedures that
prescribe what to do for given signal/warning levels. The idea is
simply to make such an assessment for different signal/warning
levels, and establish some adequate decision rules for how to act in
the different cases. This would give a level of preparedness in the
case of speciﬁc signals/warnings but would not necessarily provide
much support in the case of surprising events. It would be
impossible to prescribe what to do in all cases; hence, the
approach needs to be supplemented with other methods.
Following Cox [15], we can write the robustness problem in
general terms as (C,P,u,a), where C are the consequences of the
actions, P the probabilities of C given the actions, u the utility
function of C, and a the actions. However, it may be difﬁcult to
assign some of these values, for example, P, when the uncertainties
are large. A robust approach is then required. The key is to make
decisions that are good for a set of values of, for example, C and P,
and in this way the approach can also withstand some types of
surprises. However, the set-up used for robustness analysis often
excludes the possibility of many forms of black swans, as the
framework reﬂects the current knowledge and beliefs. The pro-
tective measures could, for example, be based on a probability
model reﬂecting variation due to a set of key risk sources but fail
to include an important one. Robust analysis is not easily con-
ducted in practice, as for example, discussed by Aven [6]. There are
many ways of looking at robustness, and it is difﬁcult to ﬁnd
arguments for why some are better than others.
It has proven helpful to distinguish management strategies for
handling the risk agent (such as a chemical or a technology) from
those needed for the risk-absorbing system (such as a building, an
organism, or an ecosystem) [33]. With respect to the risk agent,
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risk assessments can be useful, but equally important are cau-
tionary and precautionary strategies (see Section 4.3), which
include principles such as containment, substitution, safety fac-
tors, ALARP (as low as reasonably practicable), redundancy and
diversity in designing safety devices, and best available technol-
ogy. For the risk-absorbing systems, robustness and resilience are
two main categories of strategies or principles when studying risk
problems characterised by moderate or large uncertainties. Mea-
sures to improve robustness include [33,9] inserting conservatisms
or safety factors as an assurance against variation, introducing
redundant and diverse safety systems to meet multiple stress
situations, avoiding high vulnerabilities, establishing building
codes and zoning laws to protect against speciﬁc hazards. See
Joshi and Lambert [21] for an example of such a “robust manage-
ment strategy” using diversiﬁcation of engineering infrastructure
investments.
It is an objective to make the risk-absorbing systems resilient so
they can withstand surprises. Resilience is a protective strategy
against unforeseen or unthinkable events, and key instruments for
it include “the strengthening of the immune system, diversiﬁca-
tion of the means for approaching identical or similar ends, design
of systems with ﬂexible response options and the improvement of
conditions for emergency management and system adaptation”
([9], p. 129).
Resilience engineering has become an important ﬁeld for the
understanding and management of safety in socio-technical sys-
tems; see, for example, Hollnagel et al. [19]. In order to be resilient,
a system or an organisation must have the following four qualities:
the ability to
I) respond to regular and irregular threats in a robust, yet ﬂexible
manner,
II) to monitor what is going on, including its own performance,
III) to anticipate risk events and opportunities and
IV) to learn from experience [19].
This approach also highlights signals and precursors of serious
events. It is a common feature of most approaches that intend to
meet surprises. If we look at basic insights from organisational theory
and learning, we see that both this feature and resilience are main
building blocks. A good example is the concept of collective mind-
fulness, linked to high reliability organisations (HROs), with its ﬁve
principles: preoccupation with failure, reluctance to simplify, sensi-
tivity to operations, commitment to resilience, and deference to
expertise. There is a vast amount of literature (see, e.g. [20,24,43,44])
providing arguments for organisations to organise their efforts in line
with these principles to obtain high performance (high reliability)
and effectively manage risks, the unforeseen and potential surprises.
In addition, the quality discourse, with its link to “common-
cause variation” and “special-cause variation”, and the continuous
focus on learning and improvements, should be mentioned as an
approach for dealing with surprises and black swans, as noted in
the previous section. The focus on improvements leads us to the
concept of antifragility [41]. According to Taleb, the antifragile is
seen as a blueprint for living in a “black swan world”, the key
being to love randomness, variation and uncertainty to some
degree, and thus also errors. We all know that to be in top shape
and improve our bodies and minds we need some stressors, so do
other activities and systems [8].
4. Confronting the three types of black swans
Meeting black swans is obviously difﬁcult as they extend
beyond current thinking, but as we have seen there exist a number
of different approaches, strategies and measures that can be used
to confront such events. In this section, we seek further insights by
speciﬁcally addressing the three types of black swans a)–c)
described in Section 2, with emphasis on the b) and c) categories.
When writing “black swans”, we tacitly also think about “near-
black swans”.
4.1. Black swans of the unknown unknown type
Unknown unknowns are events that were completely
unknown to the scientiﬁc environment, and it is of course difﬁcult
to be prepared for such events. Focusing on resilience and signals
& warnings provides useful general means, in addition to general
scientiﬁc work generating knowledge about the relevant phenom-
ena. Increased knowledge reduces in general the probability of a
black swan of this type. Hence, testing and research are generic
measures to meet this black swan type of risk.
Take the swine ﬂu in 2009 as an example. It was caused by a
type A inﬂuenza (H1N1) virus. The World Health Organization
declared that the ﬂu had developed into a full-scale world
epidemic, and a vaccine was quickly developed. In some countries
(Sweden, Finland, Norway and Iceland), the authorities explicitly
set the goal of vaccinating the whole population. The illness
turned out to be quite mild, but it had some severe side effects
that were previously unknown; see, e.g. Munsterhjelm-Ahumada
[29]. These side effects came as surprises; they were black swans
of the type unknown unknowns.
The vaccination was carried out because the authorities
believed that the ﬂu itself would cause serious illness and
problems, at a much higher level than the side effects. Normally
there is time for fairly thorough testing of the vaccine to control
the risk related to side effects, but in 2009, this was not the case.
The uncertainties were large.
Obviously, there could be unknown side effects in the case of
vaccination, and analyses and judgements need to be conducted to
characterise the risks. The problem here was that the decision
concerning vaccination had to be taken so quickly. It was impossible
to avoid a weak knowledge base. There was no time for thorough
testing and research, and adaptive management. The authorities also
had to balance the need for faithful risk characterisations and the
desire to get the population vaccinated. In the Nordic countries
mentioned above, the authorities initiated public relations campaigns,
which can be described as “moral persuasion”. Solidarity became the
slogan: Be vaccinated to protect your fellow citizens [29].
Faithful risk characterisations addressing possible unknown
side effects (black swans) were not very well highlighted; the
black swan risk was not really an issue. One can speculate whether
it was a deliberate policy. For sure, the decision was a difﬁcult one
for the authorities because of the time pressure; they had to
balance difﬁcult judgements about the development of the ﬂu,
efﬁciency of the vaccination, risk and uncertainty issues, as well as
ethical aspects.
On this basis, it is not surprising that so many people decided
to take the vaccine. The decision became quite easy, to follow the
advice from the authorities.
From the individual person's point of view, one may argue that
the black swan risk should have been reported more faithfully. To
make an adequate decision, one has to be risk-informed. It is,
however, not straightforward how such information should have
been best communicated. The knowledge base is weak, and it is
impossible to express meaningful numbers characterising risk.
Instead, we have to rely on more general qualitative statements.
Here is a suggestion for how the risk could have been described
and communicated:
This vaccine could have unknown side effects. There are
uncertainties. We think it is unlikely that severe side effects
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will occur, but the knowledge base is rather weak and we
cannot exclude the possibility.
It is not enough to limit the statements to probability char-
acterisations. Expressing that it is unlikely that severe side effects
will occur without also referring to the knowledge base and the
potential for surprises would mislead the receiver. The knowledge
supporting the probability is as important as the probability itself.
4.2. Black swans of the unknown known type
A black swan of this type is an event that is not on the list of
those identiﬁed by the relevant risk assessment, but it is not an
unknown type of event. Its possible occurrence is known by other
persons, groups, or communities. We can formalise it in this way:
A’ are those events that we have identiﬁed in the risk assessment,
and A is the occurrence of the actual event, which is a type of
event known by others than those involved in the risk assessment.
The event is a black swan (or a near black swan) of this type
(unknown known) if A is not covered by A’.
To meet this black swan type of risk, we need
– Improved risk assessment to identify these events
– Improved communication to transfer knowledge to relevant
persons
Many types of traditional risk assessment methods address the
issue of what can happen, for example, HAZOP, HazId, FMEA, fault
tree and event tree analysis [45,28]. These methods have been
shown to work in practice, but we always need to look for
potential improvements, as the identiﬁcation of the event is an
extremely important part of risk assessment and management – if
the event is left out, the risk management will also easily leave it
out. One non-traditional method worth mentioning here is antici-
patory failure determination (AFD) [22]. It is a hazard/threat
identiﬁcation and analysis approach, which utilises I-TRIZ, a form
of the Russian-developed Theory of Inventive Problem Solving.
Traditional failure analysis addresses the question, “How did this
failure happen?” or “How can this failure happen?”. The AFD-TRIZ
goes one step further and questions “If I wanted to create this
particular failure, how could I do it?” The power of the technique
comes from the process of deliberately “inventing” failure events
and scenarios [27]. Scenario analysis [13] could also be a useful
tool to generate events and scenarios. Here, there is no search for
completeness and descriptions of the uncertainties and risks, as in
traditional risk analysis. The anticipatory backwards scenarios are
of particular importance – starting from a future imagined event/
state of the total system, the question is asked: what is needed for
this to occur?
There is potential for further development of analysis methods
to identify events/scenarios along the lines of AFD, using different
types of creative thinking; there are many others than TRIZ, as
discussed by, for example, Sternberg [39]. Such developments
should have a particular focus on aspects that block knowledge
transfer and cause a poor or inadequate understanding of the
studied system. As an example, say that the actual system has
some special features, which give it a special sensitivity (vulner-
ability) with respect to some speciﬁc operational conditions. We
can think of an operation on a person who has a special sensitivity
with respect to some substances. Then it is essential that the
scenario/event identiﬁcation is based on an acknowledgment of
this sensitivity [34].
Such special features can be seen as a special case of a more
general problem: the implications of the analysts basing their
judgements on more or less clear assumptions, hypotheses and
explanations. A key task of the event/scenario identiﬁcation is to
challenge these. A method often used for this purpose is red
teaming, which serves as a devil's advocate, offering alternative
interpretations and challenging established thinking [27]. For
example, “businesses use red teams to simulate the competition;
government organisations use red teams as ‘hackers’ to test the
security of information stored on computers or transmitted
through networks; the military uses red teams to address and
anticipate enemy courses of action” ([1], p. 136). Red teaming
challenges assumptions, generalisations, pictures, or images that
inﬂuence how we understand the world and how we take action,
that is, our mental models [35].
In the following, an example of how a red-team analysis can be
used to improve a standard event/scenario identiﬁcation is
outlined:
4.3. Adjusted event/scenario process using a red team
The assessment process has three main stages, involving two
analyst teams, referred to as teams I and II. In Stage 1, analyst team
I performs a standard event/scenario identiﬁcation (let us denote
the events/scenarios by A1’). This stage includes a self-evaluation
of the analysis, where the focus is on the mental models (assump-
tions etc.) that could restrict the event/scenario's space.
In Stage 2, analyst team II challenges team I and their mental
models, acting as a red team (the devil's advocate), and, for
example,
 argues against the mental models used by team I
 searches for unknown knowns.
In the ﬁnal Stage 3, the two analyst teams are to provide a joint
list A2’. In practice, the process needs to incorporate aspects of
probability and uncertainties – this will be explained in Section
4.3.
Returning to the example of a system with special features, a
key purpose of the red team in Stage 2 is to challenge the mental
models of analyst team I – which could mean that the team
believes that the system has no special features. By critically
questioning the validity of assumptions and pictures/images of
the system being studied, such features can be revealed and the
list of event/scenarios is likely to be adjusted.
As some people – but not those involved in the risk assessment
and the related management process – possess the knowledge, the
analysis aims to achieve knowledge building and transfer of knowl-
edge. To obtain such results, communication is essential. It could be
communication between groups of people from different organisa-
tional units and between individuals. We may think of the Deep-
water Horizon accident, where a worker did not alert others on the
rig as pressure increased on the drilling pipe, a sign of a possible
“kick” [17]. A kick is an entry of gas/ﬂuid into the wellbore, which can
set off a blowout. The worker had the knowledge (information), but
this knowledge was not communicated to the right people.
4.4. Black swans of the probability type judged negligible
This third type of black swan events is those that are on the list
of known events in the risk analysis but whose probability of
occurrence is judged negligible, and thus are not believed to occur.
Yet such events do occur, as was discussed in Section 2. How
should we deal with this type of events? Should we just accept the
risks – we have accepted that there is a small probability of an
extreme event occurring – meaning that the event could occur?
We remember the discussion in Section 2 about this issue,
relating to perfect storms. For these black swans of type c), we are
in a situation where we cannot make accurate predictions as in the
case of perfect storms. The variation in the phenomena cannot be
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described with this type of precision. The knowledge base is weak,
and the probabilities are subjective (judgemental, knowledge-
based), more or less strongly founded. There is no clear corre-
spondence between the probability assignments and the actual
occurrence of the events. Hence, it is appropriate to scrutinise both
the judgements about acceptable risk and negligible probability,
and the background knowledge that supports these judgements.
Such a scrutiny needs to be based on the acknowledgement
that
i) acceptable risk should not be determined by judgement about
probability alone
ii) events may occur even if very low probabilities are assigned
iii) cautionary and precautionary principles constitute essential
pillars of the risk management linked to such events (black
swans).
The risk analyst may derive a set of probabilities for speciﬁc
events to occur and combine them with different loss categories,
but these numbers must be seen in relation to the strength of
knowledge that supports the probabilities. We may have two
situations, giving the same probabilities: one where the assign-
ment is supported by a strong evidence base, and the other, which
relies on very poor background knowledge [10]. In engineering
contexts, common practice is built on probabilistic criteria (like a
1 104 probability limit) to determine what is an acceptable
design [11]. Such an approach cannot in general be justiﬁed as it
ignores the degree of knowledge that supports the probability
assignments. The assignments can be based on many critical
assumptions, and these assumptions could conceal important
aspects of risk and uncertainty [4]. As discussed in Section 4.2,
we may for instance assume that the present system is a standard
one, but it may turn out to have special features, for example,
being extremely sensitive to some speciﬁc hazards.
For a general discussion of such criteria, see Aven and Vinnem
[11]. These authors state that such criteria must be used with care as
they can easily lead to the wrong focus, meeting the criteria instead
of ﬁnding the overall best arrangements and measures. However, for
the practical execution of risk management activities, it is not
difﬁcult to see that some type of criteria may be useful in simplifying
the decision-making process. To be able to meet the above critique
related to the strength of knowledge supporting the probability
assignments, an adjusted procedure has been suggested if such
criteria are to be used [4] (see also Table 1):
1. If risk is found acceptable according to probability with large
margins, the risk is judged as acceptable unless the strength of
knowledge is weak (in this case the probability-based approach
should not be given much weight).
2. If risk is found acceptable according to probability, and the
strength of knowledge is strong, the risk is judged as acceptable.
3. If risk is found acceptable according to probability with
moderate or small margins, and the strength of knowledge is
not strong, the risk is judged as unacceptable and measures are
required to reduce risk.
4. If risk is found unacceptable according to probability, the risk is
judged as unacceptable and measures are required to reduce
risk.
The approach relies on cautionary thinking. It generates a
process that looks for measures to reduce risk and avoid the event
occurring – despite the fact that the judged probability is very low.
The cautionary principle states that, in the face of uncertainty,
caution should be a ruling principle, for example, by not starting
an activity or by implementing measures to reduce risks and
uncertainties [9]. The level of caution adopted has, of course, to be
balanced against other concerns, for example, costs, but to be
cautious goes beyond balancing the expected beneﬁt of risk
reductions expressed in monetary terms against expected costs.
The precautionary principle may be considered a special case of
the cautionary principle, in that it applies in the face of scientiﬁc
uncertainties [3].
Think about the vaccine example of Section 4.1. Here, we faced
scientiﬁc uncertainties concerning the side effects, and if a person
did not take the vaccine he or she could refer to the precautionary
principle. Health experts could state that the probability of side
effects is low and hence acceptable, but the strength of knowledge
supporting this type of statement is poor, and there is a need for
considerations that give due weight to the uncertainties as
discussed above.
Many safety and security measures are justiﬁed by reference to
the cautionary principle as referred to in Section 3. We implement
robust design solutions to be able to meet deviations from normal
conditions, we implement emergency preparedness measures
even if the probability of their use is very small and so on (Aven
et al., 2007) [11]. We see beyond the probabilities as we know that
surprises can occur relative to our judgements. This is to be
cautious.
Consider the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster in Japan in
March 2011. Here, the probability that such an event would occur
was considered negligible. The judgement was based on many
considerations and assumptions as discussed by Paté-Cornell [31].
These considerations and assumptions can obviously be ques-
tioned as earthquakes from the ninth and seventeenth centuries
causing tsunamis reaching heights far beyond the design criterion
of the plant were not accounted for in the design of the nuclear
reactors.
It is not obvious that better risk assessment would have led to
vital changes in the Fukushima case, but it could have. Several
weaknesses in the Fukushima assessments are pointed to by Paté-
Cornell [31], and there is also potential for improvements of the
risk assessments in general, as mentioned in Section 4.2, by giving
further attention to the knowledge and surprise dimensions. We
can illustrate this by returning to the adjusted event/scenario
process using the red team approach described in Section 4.2. This
analysis can be modiﬁed to capture a more general risk assess-
ment process. The method follows the same steps as the one
described in Section 4.2, but its focus is not only the events and
scenarios A’, but also the consequences of these events/scenarios,
C’, as well as descriptions/measurements of related uncertainties
Table 1
Adjusted procedure for use of risk acceptance criteria in view of considerations of the strength of knowledge.
Probability-based justiﬁcation Above limits Unacceptable risk Unacceptable risk Unacceptable risk
Small margin below Unacceptable risk Unacceptable risk Acceptable risk
Large margins Further considerations needed Acceptable risk Acceptable risk
Poor Medium Strong
Strength of knowledge
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(typically using probability) and judgements of the strength of
knowledge supporting these descriptions/measurements. The
assumptions have a key role in the evaluations, and “judgements
of the assumption deviation risk”, as discussed by Aven [4], is an
example of a tool that can be used to study the importance of
these assumptions. Under Stage 3, analyst team II challenges team
I and their assumptions, acting as a red team, and argues for the
occurrence of events with assigned negligible probabilities.
Cautionary thinking also applies to the use of cost–beneﬁt analyses,
where the purpose is to determine whether a measure should be
implemented – balancing different concerns. This tool is based on
expected values and hence important aspects of variation, uncertain-
ties and risk are not reﬂected [11]. A safety measure may not be
justiﬁed by reference to a cost–beneﬁt analysis, but cautionary
thinking, highlighting the additional uncertainties and risk, could
justify it. Such cautionary thinking is reﬂected in the adjusted
implementation scheme for the ALARP principle presented in Aven [4].
5. Conclusions
To confront possible black swans, we need to balance risk-based
approaches, cautionary/precautionary (robustness, resilience, adap-
tive) and discourse-based approaches. This is the general answer and
is fundamental for risk management, with and without special focus
on surprises and black swans. Only in cases where the knowledge is
very strong and the uncertainties small, can the risk-based approach
be used alone. In most situations, all three strategies are required.
The challenge is to ﬁnd an adequate balance between these
approaches and strategies, often between the ﬁrst two. When the
stakes are high and the uncertainties large, we obviously need to
highlight robust and resilient solutions and arrangements to be
prepared in case some extreme unforeseen events should occur.
Potential surprises and black swans call for robustness and resilience,
and antifragility, as discussed in Section 3.
We need to pay more attention to certain aspects compared to
typical current practices, and the article has pointed to and
highlighted some measures, linked to the way we should think
in relation to these issues. The goal has been to help analysts and
decision makers in two main ways:
1. It provides appropriate concepts and a platform for a deeper
understanding of what the risk associated with surprises and
black swans is all about.
2. It provides analysis and management principles that can
prevent, or at least reduce, the probability of black swan type
of events (which have negative consequences), and in addition
stimulate and lay a basis for the development of appropriate
speciﬁc methods that can give such an effect (reduce the risk
related to black swan type of events).
In risk analysis, events and scenarios are identiﬁed, for example,
hydrocarbon leaks, and barrier systems are in place should such
events in fact occur. Many types of events happen in the course of a
year, but they have not serious implications as the barriers work as
intended. This is also the case for near misses – but the margins are
in some cases small. Minor changes could have resulted in a disaster.
When a major accident occurs, it is often because there are several
“surprising events”. To address these issues, it is important to have an
understanding of the various concepts and how they relate. The
article contributes to this understanding (point 1 above).
In addition, the article provides speciﬁc help on how we should
proceed in order to meet the potential black swan risks. Knowl-
edge and uncertainty are key concepts. Black swans are surprises
in relation to someone's knowledge and beliefs. In the September
11 example, some people had the knowledge, others did not. In the
Fukushima example, it was the judgements and probabilities that
were essential, but they are based on data, information and
arguments/opinions, so here too the issue is knowledge. We must
think beyond current practice and theory. We need new principles
and methods. The article aims at contributing to such develop-
ments by outlining some ideas and laying a foundation for further
research in this topic.
These ideas and this foundation allow for and encourage
considerations and reinterpretations of the way risk is assessed
at different stages of an activity; these are essential features of a
management regime supporting continuous improvement. Cur-
rent risk perspectives based on probability are considered to be
less adequate for this purpose, as the frameworks presume some
stronger level of stability in the processes analysed.
Various types of analyses, including robustness analyses, can
provide insights and decision support, and, in many cases, the use
of different types of such analyses may be useful to inform the
decision maker, but we have to acknowledge that there is often
considerable arbitrariness in the choices made by the analysts and
all the tools used have strong limitations. As a consequence, care
should be shown in making too strong conclusions based on the
results of such analyses. There is always a need for a managerial
review and judgement, which places the results of the formal
analyses in a broader context where the limitations and bound-
aries of the analyses are taken into account before a decision is
made. A decision mechanically determined by the analytical
approach can seldom be justiﬁed.
The risk-based approaches incorporate risk assessments but need
to be extended and have a broader scope than the standard
probabilistic analysis commonly seen in textbooks and practice
today. The current risk conceptualisation and treatment frameworks
should be extended to include the black swan risk, and a new
generation of risk assessment and decision support methods needs
to be developed, which places more emphasis on this risk. Some
ideas have been outlined in Section 4. For the type c) black swans,
where the occurrence is not foreseen because of low assigned
probability, a proper understanding of the risk and probability
concepts is essential. Low probability events may occur, and we need
to scrutinise both the judgements made and their basis. Improved
tools are required for this purpose.
To obtain such improvements, we need a platform that incor-
porates adequate concepts, assessments and management princi-
ples and methods. This is a research issue, and to this end we ﬁnd
contributions in, for example, Aven [2] and Aven and Krohn [8].
In Aven and Krohn [8], new conceptual risk frameworks high-
lighting knowledge and uncertainties are combined with speciﬁc
insights capturing variation, knowledge and uncertainties as
mentioned. The main input comes from the collective mindfulness
concept linked to HROs, the quality discourse with its focus on
variation, system thinking and continuous improvements, as well
as the concept of antifragility [41].
There is a common belief among many engineers and managers
that to manage an activity, and avoid accidents and perform opera-
tions as planned, it is sufﬁcient to develop procedures and ensure
compliance with these. Such a compliance perspective fails, however,
in practice for non-trivial activities, as a perfect system cannot be
developed; surprises always occur. The system understanding is too
static, and improvements and excellence are not sufﬁciently stimu-
lated. We have to acknowledge that to obtain excellence and avoid
accidents we need to acknowledge the performance, risk and knowl-
edge “dynamics”. We need to see beyond compliance. For many
types of systems, the signals and warnings are of a form that requires
judgements and actions that need considerations beyond speciﬁed
procedures.
This means that a traditional engineering risk analysis per-
spective cannot be used to meet the black swan type of risk. We
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need to incorporate the dynamic aspects, which are better covered
by principles such as those of the collective mindfulness concept
and by resilience engineering, as well as tools of adaptive analysis
and similar approaches. Through the study of the three types of
black swans, we have seen the importance of analysis to gain
knowledge, but also the need for recognition of what is outside the
analysis sphere. With the perspectives on risk adopted in this
article, there is an acknowledgement of uncertainty and strength
of knowledge as key pillars of the risk descriptions, and the need
for a proper understanding of what constitutes assessment and
what belongs to the management sphere, is essential. There will
always be a need for managerial review and judgement that sees
beyond the assessment part, as thoroughly discussed by Aven [6].
The cautionary and precautionary principles need to be seen as
rational elements of any approach to meet the black swan risks, as
they provide guidance on how to deal with the leap from
assessment to decision-making.
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